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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES


4 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: The Evolving "Solution" to the Cyprus Dispute

The Acting Director of Central Intelligence has requested that the attached memorandum from the Board of National Estimates be circulated to a limited number of recipients.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

  
SHERMAN KENT  
Chairman

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

4 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: The Evolving "Solution" to the Cyprus Dispute

SUMMARY

A. President Makarios' power to influence the ultimate future of Cyprus has increased considerably in recent months, and we do not foresee any reversal of this trend in the near future. Makarios probably will continue to be successful in resisting efforts by the Greek government to undermine him. His month-old peace offensive, which has eased the pressures on the Turkish Cypriots, probably has increased international support for the Greek Cypriots, and has made it more difficult than ever for Turkey to use the threat of military intervention to influence events on the island. A continuation of this new policy may lead a fair number of Turkish Cypriots to give up the struggle even though control of the government remains in Greek Cypriot hands.

B. Thus while no agreed settlement of the conflict is in sight and the dispute will drag on diplomatically, a de facto victory for Makarios appears likely. It remains unclear whether Makarios will use this influence to remain head of a small island -- relying to a considerable extent on support from the USSR and the non-aligned world internationally and on the Communist Party locally, or whether he will attempt to bring about enosis under such favorable conditions as to make it possible for him to play an important role in Greek politics.

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GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

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1. President Makarios' September decision to relax the pressure on the Turkish Cypriots marks a new phase in the Cyprus conflict. Previously Makarios had followed a policy of using as much pressure against the Turkish Cypriots as he could without sparking Turkish intervention. Taking advantage of US opposition to Turkish intervention -- and Ankara's reluctance to take action which might have led to a Greek-Turkish war -- Makarios had demonstrated considerable skill in the art of brinksmanship. The Turkish air strikes in early August apparently persuaded him that he had about reached the limit of a policy of military pressure, and that his intensification of economic pressures only led to increased Turkish Cypriot determination to resist and to growing dangers of Turkish military moves to break the economic blockade.

2. Moreover, if the Greek Cypriots were to gain the support they obviously hoped for from the forthcoming UN General Assembly session, Makarios probably felt certain humanitarian steps were desirable if not essential. Thus he offered to lift the economic blockade of Turkish Cypriot areas, to grant a general amnesty, to resettle Turkish refugees, to remove all armed posts if the Turks would do the same, and to accept UN suggestions for general pacification. Makarios probably believes that his new approach will also

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cause some of the long-suffering Turkish Cypriots to give up the struggle. In any case, such an attempt costs Makarios little, since none of the offers he has made would alter the fact that control of the government of Cyprus would remain in Greek Cypriot hands -- the basic aim of the Greek Cypriots when they launched the present struggle in December 1963.

Changing Conditions on Cyprus

3. Despite the bitterness and hatred engendered by the violence of the past 10 months, there is some chance that if Makarios continues his present course of relative moderation a fair number of Turkish Cypriots will cease to follow their more intransigent leaders. How many would be willing to live in perpetuity under Greek Cypriot rule and how many would emigrate to Turkey would depend on a great variety of factors, of course, but at least many of the peasants probably would stay if they felt secure in their persons. Turkish Cypriots in Limosol and Ktima as well as in several villages have already accepted cease-fire terms amounting to surrender and are living under Greek Cypriot rule. Despite the claims of Turkish Cypriots that they would die rather than surrender, in none of these places have

more than 10-20 Turks died before their forces surrendered. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriots in the other isolated areas are clearly dispirited and becoming increasingly despondent, and many of them will be strongly tempted to try to return to a more normal existence if Makarios gives them any choice other than dogged resistance or surrender.

4. The major exception to this changing Turkish Cypriot attitude is that of the Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia and along the Nicosia-Kyrenia road. However, even they are weary of the struggle and are probably more susceptible to Makarios' peace offensive than they would have been a few months ago. Yet their position is much stronger than that of the other Turkish Cypriots. There are enough of them in this area (some 35,000) and enough of the community's leaders to enable them to maintain their morale to some extent. Moreover, they hold -- in connection with the 650-man Turkish army contingent -- an area of sufficient strategic importance so that they are still far from ready to call off their resistance. This has been clearly demonstrated during recent weeks by their unwillingness to accept the terms for opening the Nicosia-Kyrenia road which were worked out by Ankara with the Greek Cypriots and the UN. Nevertheless, even these Turkish Cypriots are becoming

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increasingly convinced that their hope for achieving either federation or partition is slight because of Turkey's unwillingness to use military force against Makarios.

5. The Greek Cypriots apparently no longer feel the need to repress the Turkish Cypriots. The former do not appear to be in the same frustrated, destructive frame of mind they were in when the struggle began. In part this is probably because control of the government is now in Greek Cypriot hands, thereby increasing their assurance and self-confidence regarding the future. At least some of the Greek Cypriots are probably also growing tired of the struggle, though this is much less apparent than is Turkish Cypriot war weariness. Finally, the Greek Cypriot forces, which began as virtually autonomous bands, have gradually been brought under the authority of the government. Makarios could, of course, revert to a policy of force, though this seems unlikely for at least the next few months. New incidents could also lead to new rounds of bloodshed, but the chances of such incidents seem less than a few months or even a few weeks ago.

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International Developments

6. Makarios has also been successful in securing international support for the Greek Cypriot position. He has for some time attempted to gain increased Soviet support, both in terms of arms supplies and Soviet agreement to oppose any Turkish military move against the island. The recent Cypriot delegation to Moscow, while not as successful as Makarios would like the West to believe, apparently did secure a Soviet agreement to supply arms and a vague Soviet promise to oppose -- in an undefined manner -- any Turkish military moves. While Moscow has not rushed to commit its prestige to the support of the Greek Cypriots, it appears to have become increasingly convinced that Makarios has considerable staying power and is worth supporting. However, the USSR probably would curtail its support if it believed Makarios was moving toward enosis, and probably would actively oppose enosis if it appeared to be leading to an extension of NATO influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

7. Makarios has already secured from the non-aligned conference recently held in Cairo a unanimous resolution supporting Cyprus' right to self-determination and condemning outside interference in the affairs of the island. Most of the nearly 50 countries

that voted for such a resolution in Cairo would find it difficult not to support a similar resolution in the forthcoming UN General Assembly. Thus if Makarios continues his present policies he probably can secure a good majority in the UN. He would use such a resolution to surmise that Turkey's rights under the London-Zurich Accord are null and void. In any case, a General Assembly resolution favoring full self-determination and opposing outside interference would place further inhibitions on any Turkish intervention. Combined with more humane treatment of the Turkish Cypriots, such a resolution probably will make it increasingly difficult for the Turks to prevent further erosion of their position and of the position of their community on Cyprus.

8. Thus Makarios' peace offensive presents major difficulties for Turkey, though of a different nature than Turkey's earlier problems. Having apparently decided at the end of the summer that it would henceforth have to take a stronger line with Makarios and pay less attention to US urgings of caution, Ankara committed itself to using force if necessary to rotate its military contingent on the island and to send food and other supplies to beleaguered Turkish Cypriots. Once Makarios offered to ease pressure on the Turkish Cypriots, however, Ankara had little choice but to test his sincerity.

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Since then, the economic blockade has been modified enough so that Turkey feels it unnecessary if not impossible to rely on force to break it. Moreover, agreements have been reached on opening the Nicosia-Kyrenia road, and apparently on the troop rotation issue as well. In sum, Turkey has both less reason and less opportunity to intervene in Cyprus than it has had since the conflict began.

9. At the same time, Makarios has progressively circumscribed the ability of the Greek government leaders to control his actions. General Grivas appears to be steadily losing influence while the Archbishop has been gaining, and it seems likely that in a showdown the latter would emerge victorious.

10. Some Greek leaders still believe that Greek Cypriot enthusiasm for union with Greece is powerful enough to permit a coup -- backed by the 10,000 man Greek military force on the island -- to oust Makarios and proclaim "instant enosis" with Greece. These leaders have promised that, once in control, they will agree to a NATO base on the island, but that the US must guarantee to prevent Turkish intervention while enosis is effected. However, if it became known that one object of the operation was to offer concessions to Turkey, the Greek Cypriots would turn against it, seriously

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jeopardizing its chance of success. Indeed, unless it were well planned and quickly executed, it could lead to open fighting between Greek and Greek Cypriot forces, with disastrous political consequences for Papandreou. Given the uncertainties and the political risks involved, we think Papandreou is not likely to attempt "instant enosis" as a means of outmaneuvering Makarios.

11. Thus Makarios continues to increase his power to decide the status of Cyprus. He has said that his ultimate objective is enosis and that when this is achieved he will abandon his political role and confine himself to his ecclesiastical responsibilities. Priests in the Greek Church have often served as secular leaders in times of stress and retired again when the strife was over.

12. There are, however, good grounds for believing that Makarios would rather remain as president of an independent Cyprus than see Cyprus become a part of Greece and withdraw to his religious role. With the growth of anti-Western and pro-Soviet attitudes on Cyprus -- and the feeling of many Greek Cypriots that Greece has not given them its full support -- Makarios today probably has greater freedom to attach conditions to enosis than he had a few months ago. Thus Makarios may see himself leading a small

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but not unimportant non-aligned nation, relying for support on the UAR and the USSR as well as on Greece. For domestic support he would continue to rely heavily on the powerful Communist Party of Cyprus (AKEL), which he has always regarded as a group he could use for his own ends. Despite his popularity and skill at political maneuvering, this would be a dangerous game, for AKEL is well-organized and led, and the non-Communist political forces are weak and disorganized. Under such conditions, Cyprus might move considerably closer to the USSR than it is at present, though it seems unlikely that Makarios would willingly become completely dependent on Moscow.

13. It is even possible that Makarios has political ambitions that cannot be satisfied within the bounds of a small island republic. He may believe that, if he is able to bring about enosis on his terms, he will be such a hero to the Greek populace that he can play a leading role in the political life of Greece itself. Thus he has firmly resisted granting any concessions to the Turks -- such as agreeing to a Turkish base -- in return for Turkish agreement to enosis. He has even said that the UN sovereign bases would have to be removed before enosis could be carried out. Moreover, he apparently has begun to seek to recruit political supporters in Greece.

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This move may be only a precaution in case Greek Prime Minister Papandreu attempts to move against him, but it could also be a first step to build a political organization in Greece.

14. Whether Cyprus becomes an independent Greek Cypriot state or is united with Greece thus is likely to be determined largely by President Makarios. Either development will be extremely repugnant to Turkey, though Turkish leaders seem to prefer an independent Cyprus, even if it is friendly to the USSR, to a Cyprus joined to Greece. While independence has appeared to many as contrary to Turkey's national interest, the Turkish attitude may be due to factors other than frustration and bitterness. Once enosis occurs, Turkey's chance of gaining a position of any real influence on the island will have disappeared. The Turks may calculate that an independent Cyprus -- drifting closer to Moscow -- could gradually become of greater concern to all of NATO and that opposition to Turkish military action might then decline. In any case, Inonu's minority government, which is due to face national elections by October 1965, is too weak to agree to any of the solutions proposed for Cyprus, though it may be strong enough to resist pressures for


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military intervention, particularly if Makarios continues his  
peace offensive.

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FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:



SHERMAN KENT  
Chairman

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
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Honorable Phillips Talbot, Assistant  
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William Miller, NE/SA, USIA

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30 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: The Evolving "Solution" to the Cyprus Dispute

SUMMARY

President Makarios' power to influence the ultimate future of Cyprus has increased considerably in recent months, and we do not foresee any reversal of this trend in the near future. Makarios probably will continue to be successful in resisting efforts by the Greek government to undermine him. His month-old peace offensive, which has eased the pressures on the Turkish Cypriots, probably has increased international support for the Greek Cypriots, and has made it more difficult than ever for Turkey to use the threat of military intervention to influence events on the island. A continuation of this new policy may lead a fair number of Turkish Cypriots to give up the struggle even though control of the government remains in Greek Cypriot hands.

Thus while no agreed settlement of the conflict is in sight and the dispute will drag on diplomatically, a de facto victory for Makarios appears likely. It remains unclear whether Makarios will use this influence to remain head of a small island -- relying to a considerable extent on support from the USSR and the non-aligned world internationally and on the Communist Party locally, or whether he will attempt to bring about enosis under such favorable conditions as to make it possible for him to play an important role in Greek politics.

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2. Moreover, if the Greek Cypriots were to gain the support they obviously hoped for from the forthcoming UN General Assembly session, Makarios probably felt certain humanitarian steps were desirable if not essential. Thus he offered to lift the economic blockade of Turkish Cypriot areas, to grant a general amnesty, to resettle Turkish refugees, to remove all armed posts if the Turks

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would do the same, and to accept UN suggestions for general pacification. Makarios probably believes that his new approach will also cause some of the long-suffering Turkish Cypriots to give up the struggle. In any case, such an attempt costs Makarios little, since none of the offers he has made would alter the fact that control of the government of Cyprus would remain in Greek Cypriot hands -- the basic aim of the Greek Cypriots when they launched the present struggle in December 1963.

Changing Conditions on Cyprus

3. Despite the bitterness and hatred engendered by the violence of the past 10 months, there is some chance that if Makarios continues his present course of relative moderation a fair number of Turkish Cypriots will cease to follow their more intransigent leaders. How many would be willing to live in perpetuity under Greek Cypriot rule and how many would emigrate to Turkey would depend on a great variety of factors, of course, but at least many of the peasants probably would stay if they felt secure in their persons. Turkish Cypriots in Limosol and Ktima as well as in several villages have already accepted cease-fire terms amounting to surrender and are living under Greek Cypriot rule. Despite the claims of Turkish Cypriots that they

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4. The major exception to this changing Turkish Cypriot attitude is that of the Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia and along the Nicosia-Kyrenia road. However, even they are weary of the struggle and are probably more susceptible to Makarios' peace offensive than they would have been a few months ago. Yet their position is much stronger than that of the other Turkish Cypriots. There are enough of them in this area (some 35,000) and enough of the community's leaders to enable them to maintain their morale to some extent. Moreover, they hold -- in connection with the 650-man Turkish army contingent -- an area of sufficient strategic importance so that they are still far from ready to call off their resistance. This has been clearly demonstrated during recent weeks by their unwillingness to accept the terms for opening the Nicosia-Kyrenia road which were worked out by Ankara with the

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Greek Cypriots and the UN. Nevertheless, even these Turkish Cypriots are becoming increasingly convinced that their hope for achieving either federation or partition is slight because of Turkey's unwillingness to use military force against Makarios.

5. The Greek Cypriots apparently no longer feel the need to repress the Turkish Cypriots. The former do not appear to be in the same frustrated, destructive frame of mind they were in when the struggle began. In part this is probably because control of the government is now in Greek Cypriot hands, thereby increasing their assurance and self-confidence regarding the future. At least some of the Greek Cypriots are probably also growing tired of the struggle, though this is much less apparent than is Turkish Cypriot war weariness. Finally, the Greek Cypriot forces, which began as virtually autonomous bands, have gradually been brought under the authority of the government. Makarios could, of course, revert to a policy of force, though this seems unlikely for at least the next few months. New incidents could also lead to new rounds of bloodshed, but the chances of such incidents seem less than a few months or even a few weeks ago.

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7. Makarios has already secured a unanimous resolution from the nonaligned conference recently held in Cairo supporting Cyprus' right to self-determination and condemning outside

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interference in the affairs of the island. It would be difficult for many of the nearly 50 countries that voted for such a resolution in Cairo to fail to support a similar resolution in the UN General Assembly later this year. Thus if Makarios continues his present policies he probably can secure a good majority in the UN. He would use such a resolution to argue that Turkey's rights under the London-Zurich Accord are null and void. In any case, a General Assembly resolution favoring full self-determination and opposing outside interference would place further inhibitions on any Turkish intervention. Combined with more humane treatment of the Turkish Cypriots, such a resolution probably will make it increasingly difficult for the Turks to prevent further erosion of their position and of the position of their community on Cyprus.

8. Thus Makarios' peace offensive presents major difficulties for Turkey, though of a different nature than Turkey's earlier problems. Having apparently decided at the end of the summer that it would henceforth have to take a stronger line with Makarios and pay less attention to US urgings of caution, Ankara committed itself to using force if necessary to rotate its military contingent on the island and to send food and other supplies to beleaguered Turkish Cypriots. Once Makarios offered to ease pressure on the

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Turkish Cypriots, however, Ankara had little choice but to test his sincerity. Since then, the economic blockade has been modified enough so that Turkey feels it unnecessary if not impossible to rely on force to break it. Moreover, agreements have been reached on opening the Nicosia-Kyrenia road, and apparently on the troop rotation issue as well. In sum, Turkey has less reason or opportunity to intervene in Cyprus than it has had since the conflict began.

9. At the same time, Makarios has progressively circumscribed the ability of the Greek government leaders to control his actions. General Grivas appears to be steadily losing influence while the Archbishop has been gaining, and it seems likely that in a showdown the latter would emerge victorious.

10. Some Greek leaders still believe that Greek Cypriot enthusiasm for union with Greece is powerful enough to permit a coup -- backed by the 10,000 man Greek military force on the island -- to oust Makarios and proclaim "instant enosis" with Greece. These leaders have promised that, once in control, they will agree to a NATO base on the island, but that the US must guarantee to prevent Turkish intervention while enosis is effected.

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However, if it became known that one object of the operation was to offer concessions to Turkey, the Greek Cypriots would turn against it, seriously jeopardizing its chance of success. Indeed, unless it were well planned and quickly executed, it could lead to open fighting between Greek and Greek Cypriot forces, with disastrous political consequences for Papandreou. Given the uncertainties and the political risks involved, we think Papandreou is not likely to attempt "instant enosis" as a means of outmaneuvering Makarios.

11. Thus Makarios continues to increase his power to decide the status of Cyprus. He has said that his ultimate objective is enosis and that when this is achieved he will abandon his political role and confine himself to his ecclesiastical responsibilities. Priests in the Greek Church have often served as secular leaders in times of stress and retired again when the strife was over.

12. There are, however, good grounds for believing that Makarios would rather remain as president of an independent Cyprus than see Cyprus become a part of Greece and withdraw to his religious role. With the growth of anti-Western and pro-Soviet attitudes on Cyprus -- and the feeling of many Greek Cypriots that Greece has not given them its full support -- Makarios today

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probably has greater freedom to attach conditions to enosis than he had a few months ago. Thus Makarios may see himself leading a small but not unimportant nonaligned nation, relying for support on the UAR and the USSR as well as Greece. For domestic support he would continue to rely heavily on the powerful Communist Party of Cyprus (AKEL), which he has always regarded as a group he could use for his own ends. Despite his popularity and skill at political maneuvering this would be a dangerous game, for AKEL is well-organized and led, and the non-Communist political forces are weak and disorganized. Under such conditions, Cyprus probably might move considerably closer to the USSR than it is at present, though it seems unlikely that Makarios would willingly become completely dependent on Moscow.

13. It is even possible that Makarios has political ambitions that can not be satisfied within the bounds of a small island republic. He may believe that if he is able to bring about enosis on his terms that he will be such a hero to the Greek populace as to enable him to play a leading role in the political life of Greece itself. Thus he has firmly resisted granting any concessions to the Turks -- such as agreeing to a Turkish base -- in return for Turkish agreement to enosis. He has even said that

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the UN sovereign bases would have to be removed before enosis could be carried out. Moreover, he apparently has begun to seek to recruit political supporters in Greece. This move may be only a precaution in case Greek Prime Minister Papandreou attempts to move against him, but it could also be a first step to build a political organization in Greece.

14. Whether Cyprus becomes a unitary Greek Cypriot state or is united with Greece thus is likely to be determined largely by President Makarios and what he sees as the best method of satisfying his ambitions for political leadership. Either development will be extremely repugnant to Turkey, though Turkish leaders seem to prefer an independent Cyprus, even if it is friendly to the USSR, to a Cyprus joined to Greece. While independence has appeared to many as contrary to Turkey's national interest, the Turkish attitude may be due to factors other than frustration and bitterness. Once enosis occurs, Turkey's chance of gaining a position of any real influence on the island will have disappeared. The Turks may calculate that an independent Cyprus -- drifting closer to Moscow -- could gradually become of greater concern to all of NATO and that opposition to Turkish military action might then decline. In any case, Inonu's minority government, which is due to face national elections by October 1965, is too weak to

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agree to any of the solutions proposed for Cyprus, though it may be strong enough to resist pressures for military intervention, particularly if Makarios continues his peace offensive.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:



SHERMAN KENT  
Chairman

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Date 30 Jul 64

To ✓  
From Sherman Kent

To: Mr. McCone. A/DCI

This is a good piece  
on the present & probable  
future of the Cyprus mess.

With your authorization  
we would like to give it  
a small circulation  
outside the Agency.

I already *OK'd this* ✓  
*OK'd this* ✓  
*OK'd this* ✓